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Second-Best Solution: The First Amendment, Broadcast Indecency,
and the V-Chip
Howard M. Wasserman
I. INTRODUCrION
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and the press'
has never been considered absolute.2 Despite the common view of
the First Amendment as an important symbol of America, the right of
free speech often is abridged to serve the "perceived needs of govern-
ance."' 3 A good illustration of this principle is the law regulating con-
tent on broadcast television and radio, the media that traditionally
have "received the most limited First Amendment protection."'4
1 The First Amendment states, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law... abridging
freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 429 (1989) (invalidating state ban on flag-burn-
ing); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected by
the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (holding that
fighting words are not protected by the First Amendment).
3 STEVEN H. Stmirrin, Tnm Fmsr AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND RoMANCE 5 (1990).
Under the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, the government may regulate
based on the content or subject matter of speech if such regulation or restriction is carefully
tailored to "promote a compelling interest [through] .. . the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest." Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). This
standard has been stated several ways by the Court. See Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N.
Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1487, 1528-29 (1995) (quoting the
various formulations of the compelling interest standard).
For a discussion of the issue of content-based regulation, see Martin H. Redish, The Content
Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN'. L. REV. 113 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Con-
tent Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
4 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). The Court has supported this different
treatment by distinguishing broadcasting from other media. See iL at 748-49 (setting out the
"uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcast radio and television and their unique accessibility to
children as reasons for treating them differently).
A third rationale for the lesser protection of broadcasting is based on scarcity of space on
the broadcast spectrum. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969). The scarcity
rationale is beyond the scope of this Comment. Scarcity has been the subject of much scholarly
criticism, but it is relevant to the question of required access to air time, rather than to govern-
ment control of indecent content, which is the focus of this Comment. Se4 e.g., LUCAS A. PowE,
JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FrIsr AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987); Laurence H.
Winer, The Signal Cable Sends-Part I: Why Can't Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 MD. L.
REV. 212, 21840 (1987). But see Tuer Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994) (refus-
ing to reconsider the scarcity rationale despite criticism).
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The programming most often at the center of such content regu-
lation is material that is indecent, but not obscene.5 The government
usually justifies its regulation of indecent material based on an in-
dependent "interest in the well-being of its children."' 6 Combining
this interest with the lesser First Amendment protection afforded
broadcasting, the Supreme Court has allowed the FCC to punish the
broadcast on radio and television of indecent (but not obscene) mate-
rial at a time when children were in the audience. 7 More recently, in
5 Both indecent and obscene material are banned from broadcast media under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 (1994) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio
communication shall be fined... or imprisoned."). However, the two categories are distinct.
Obscenity does not receive First Amendment protection and may be proscribed entirely.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. The Court defined obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973),
as "works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value."
The FCC defined indecent material as "language that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs." Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58
F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996) [hereinafter ACTII1]
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is a broad category of speech, covering
everything from the Playboy Channel to serious discussions about AIDS and homosexuality to
fictional stories or comedy routines featuring strong, realistic language or adult themes. J.M.
Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DuKE LJ.
1131, 1133 (1996).
Indecent material generally is regarded as fully protected by the First Amendment, although
language in some opinions has hinted that it receives lesser protection. Compare Sable, 492 U.S.
at 126 ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amend-
ment ...."), with Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 (stating that while some patently offensive indecent
material is protected, it "surely lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment concern"). The Court
refused to decide the question of lesser protection in its most recent indecency case. See Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391 (1996) (plurality opinion of
Breyer, J.).
The Supreme Court finally considered and rejected a vagueness challenge to the indecency
standard in Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2389-90. Prior to that decision, lower courts had inferred from
the Pacifica Court's use of the indecency standard that the standard was not unconstitutionally
vague. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332,1339 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [herein-
after ACT 1]. For a discussion of the indecency standard as unconstitutionally vague, see
Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 ViL. SPORTs & ENT. LJ. 221 (1996).
Violent television programming also has been a subject of regulatory concern, although the
Supreme Court never has addressed regulation of violent content. Since violent speech also
receives full First Amendment protection, similar issues arise; in fact, violence and indecency
often are linked in the same regulatory schemes. See Pown, supra note 4, at 187; see generally
Edwards & Berman, supra note 3 (providing detailed analysis of the regulation of violent con-
tent on television).
6 ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 661. The Court established that the government's interest in the well-
being of its youth is a compelling interest for controlling speech content in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (upholding state law banning the sale of obscene reading material
to children under age seventeen), and affirmed it last term in Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2391; Id. at
2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
7 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
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the ACT 111 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld as constitutional a federal law ban-
ning indecent programming from the airwaves between the hours of
six a.m. and ten p.m.8
Professor Jonathan Weinberg argues that the system of broadcast
regulation "conflicts, starkly and gratuitously, with conventional free-
speech philosophy." 9 This conflict between broadcast regulation and
free speech theory is so great, he says, that any government regulatory
scheme can be "no better than a second-best solution."'10 Unfortu-
nately, the current scheme is hardly second-best. Rather, current "ef-
forts to regulate indecent programming further evidence how public
interest perceptions continue to deviate from constitutional norms,
notwithstanding official assertions that the same [F]irst [A]mendment
principles should be equally applicable to both.""
Current government regulation of broadcast speech-the sixteen-
hour ban upheld in ACT Ill-is based on an independent interest in
protecting children, resulting in a regulatory scheme that is too far
removed from First Amendment law. First, the rationales outlined in
Pacifica do not justify the lesser protection given to broadcasting com-
pared with other media, nor do they support some general regulatory
scheme.12 Second, the Pacifica scheme severely restricts adults' rights
to see, hear, and enjoy constitutionally protected speech. 13 Third, the
scheme creates "thorny problems ... in the delicate relationships be-
8 ACT 11, 58 F.3d at 660-61; see infra section II.B.3.
9 Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAI. L. REv. 1103, 1205 (1993). Profes-
sor Weinberg explicitly did not present policy solutions that "will solve all of the problems of the
broadcasting system," because "no such policy solution can exist." id. at 1203-04.
10 Id. at 1206.
11 Donald E. Lively, Modern Media and the First Amendment Rediscovering Freedom of the
Press, 67 WASH. L. REv. 599, 615 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). As one court put
it: "While we apply strict scrutiny to regulations of this kind regardless of the medium... our
assessment... must necessarily take into account the unique context of the broadcast medium."
ACT Ii, 58 F.3d at 660. This is the unresolved paradox of broadcast regulation that illustrates
the degree of departure between broadcast regulation and the First Amendment. See infra sub-
part III.B.
12 See PowE, supra note 4, at 209-15; MATrHEw L. SPIT-ZER, SEVEN DmRTY WoRDs AND Six
OTFmR STORIEs 6 (1986) (finding no justifiable differences between broadcast and print); Ed-
wards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1497 ("[J]ustifications distinguishing broadcast from other
media... will not hold."); Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends, Part II-Interference
from the Indecency Cases?, 55 FoRDAM L. REv. 459,522 (1987) ("[N]o basis for distinguishing
between cable and broadcasting."). But see Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-87 (plurality opinion of
Breyer, J.) (applying Pacifica factors to cable). For further discussion, see infra subpart III.A.
13 Winer, supra note 12, at 521 ("Solicitude for children ... abridges adults' First Amend-
ment rights."). The effect is to make "completely unavailable to adults material which may not
constitutionally be kept" from them. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Such a
result violates the long-standing principle that the state cannot reduce the adult population to
reading only what is fit for children. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957); see also
infra section III.B.1.
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tween and among parents, children, and the state" by preempting the
rights of parents to raise their children and to decide what they see on
television.' 4 Finally, the scheme ignores the fact that the context in
which the independent protection interest has been established in
First Amendment doctrine is inapposite to the regulation of protected
speech to a mixed audience. 15
The best regulatory scheme, from the standpoint of free speech
philosophy, would recognize that non-obscene speech does not justify
content-based regulation.' 6 But this is politically unacceptable to leg-
islators who want to "give the public a feeling that 'something is being
done"' to protect children from indecent material in the media.17
Thus, the task is to create a regulatory scheme that is more solicitous
of free speech while recognizing the political need for some regula-
tion. This Comment seeks to outline that second-best solution.18
The key to any such solution is the fundamental First Amend-
ment presumption that protected speech must be disseminated to be
seen, heard, and enjoyed by a willing audience. The government can-
not stop speech at the source; rather, all unwilling viewers bear the
14 FRANKLYN S. HAmAN, SPEEcH AND LAW IN A FRE Socmr'Y 179 (1981). The sixteen-
hour ban disturbs that balance by infringing on the right of parents to decide how to raise their
children. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ACT II1, 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting); see infra
section III.B2.
15 A close look at the cases asserting a protection interest illustrates this point. See Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (involving indecent speech to a student
audience at a school assembly that did not abridge the rights of adults); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636
(involving material obscene as to minors); see infra section III.B.3.
16 Winer, supra note 12, at 525; see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguing that if speech is not obscene, then the Commission "lacked statutory authority to ban
it"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) ("Speech that is neither obscene
as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.");
HArmAN, supra note 14, at 179 (arguing children should be exposed to whatever protected
speech they may encounter in the real world and should be given the guidance that will aid them
in learning how to respond wisely and healthfully).
17 THOMAS I. EMERSON, TrE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExI'nEssION 502 (1970); see also
PowE, supra note 4, at 187 (discussing pressure on the FCC to "do something"); SHMFFIN, supra
note 3, at 5 (arguing that governmental needs may change the meaning of First Amendment
protection); Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1206 ("It is insufficient.., simply to conform our law to
ordinary free-speech philosophy."). Further, the doctrine of lesser protection for broadcasting is
well-entrenched, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748 (1978) ("[O]f all forms of commu-
nication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.");
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) ("[D]ifferences in the characteristics of
new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."), and the
Supreme Court is unwilling to reconsider its justifications for that lesser protection. See Denver,
116 S. Ct. at 2385-87 (applying Pacifica rationales to cable); Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457 (refusing
to reconsider the scarcity rationale despite criticism).
18 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1204 ("The better course may be to look for second-best
solutions.").
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burden of taking affirmative steps to avoid that speech.19 The solution
would employ "institutional safeguards" to provide parents and un-
willing viewers with information about programming and the means to
avoid those programs if they so choose.20 This Comment argues first
that broadcasting should receive the same First Amendment protec-
tion as other media.21 Second, it argues that the government's com-
pelling interest when regulating broadcast indecency is not in
protecting children-that is a role for parents, not the government.22
19 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the minimal discomfort
suffered by a listener... during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm and switch
stations or flick the 'off' button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve... the right of those
interested to receive, a message entitled to full First Amendment protection."); id. at 766 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (rejecting decision that "permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a
protected message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended minority" of viewers);
Winer, supra note 12, at 523 (arguing that individual sensibilities generally are "insufficient to
override the substantial first amendment interests of... willing viewers"); id. (arguing that it is
"better to preserve first amendment freedoms, even at the expense of some brief incidents of
offense to sensitive individuals"); see also EMERSON, supra note 17, at 17 (arguing that "expres-
sion must be protected against government curtailment at all points" and "regulations... must
be based upon principles which promote, rather than retard" individual expression); Martin H.
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 624 (1982) ("The point... is to
balance with 'a thumb on the scales' in favor of speech."). Any regulations of broadcasting thus
must ensure that the protected speech gets out over the airwaves to be heard and enjoyed by
willing listeners.
For example, a law requiring a willing recipient of speech to request that certain materials
be sent to him was an unconstitutional abridgment on his First Amendment rights. See Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). Instead, the sensibilities of the unwilling recipient
were fully safeguarded by a similar opportunity to request that delivery be stopped. Id. at 310
(Brennan, J., concurring); see also Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2391 (holding that requirement that
viewers request indecent channels in writing restricted viewing by subscribers who feared for
their reputations).
Likewise, the Court has never held that the "[g]overnment itself can shut off the flow of
mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended." Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,72 (1983). Instead, the unwilling viewers bear the affirmative duty of
"averting their eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Further, the "Constitution
does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently
offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer." Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210.
Finally, it is a cardinal principle of the First Amendment that the remedy to protect the unwilling
listener "is more speech, not enforced silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring); see also infra note 127 and accompanying text.
20 SPrr7nR, supra note 12, at 125-26. Another scholar called these "informational filters."
See Balkin, supra note 5, at 1132.
21 The rationales used to distinguish broadcasting from other media, particularly cable televi-
sion, "may sound good but they cannot provide a distinction that sets broadcasting apart."
PowE, supra note 4, at 210; see also Wmer, supra note 12, at 522-23 ("[T]here is no significant
difference between the media."). See discussion infra subpart III.A.
22 NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN TE WAsTELAND: CHILDREN,
TELEVISION, AND i-m FiRsT AMENDMENT 164 (1995) ("[P]arents must... take primary respon-
sibility for what their children see on television."). But see Denver, 116 S. CL at 2391 (reaffirm-
ing government's protection interest). For a history of the government's interest in protecting
children from speech, see Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children
from Broadcast Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 15 (1996).
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Instead, the sole interest that the government should assert and ad-
vance is a facilitation interest: "facilitating parental control" over
what their children see and hear.23 This distinction is vital because the
stated interest determines which regulations are the least restrictive
means to serve that interest.24
This Comment concludes that Congress created the second-best
solution with the V-Chip provision in the Telecommunications Act of
1996,25 by expressly relying on an interest in facilitating parental con-
trol over their children's television viewing. The law requires that the
television industry rate programs and transmit those ratings with the
broadcast signal, that television sets be equipped with a device that
reads the signal, and that parents have the means to screen out those
programs, channels, or time slots they do not want their children to
watch.26
Part II of this Comment analyzes the statutory and case law sup-
port for the current laws regulating broadcast indecency. It focuses on
Pacifica and ACT III, the key decisions upholding content-based regu-
lations. Part III discusses the problems with the current regulatory
scheme, concentrating mainly on scholarly criticism of the distinction
between broadcasting and other media, and the current scheme's in-
fringement on the First Amendment and other constitutional rights of
adults. Part IV analyzes the "facilitation interest" and its support
from scholars and judges, and then discusses the V-Chip law and its
constitutionality, showing why it is the second-best solution to regulat-
ing broadcast indecency.
H. STATE OF THE LAW OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
The statutory power of the FCC to regulate content in broadcast-
ing is derived from an interplay of two statutory provisions. The first
makes it a crime to "utter any obscene, indecent or profane language"
23 See Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1563 ("The state's compelling interest lies not in
protecting children, but in protecting parenting.").
The government usually asserts both interests in support of its broadcast regulations. See
e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50; ACT 11, 58 F.3d at 660; see also infra Part II. The problem is
that these interests do not support the same types of regulations and generally cannot stand
together. ACT III, 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting). Thus, the government should
assert only a facilitation interest and should never pass a regulation in the name of guarding
children from protected speech in broadcasting. See infra Part IV.
24 Thus, an outright prohibition on indecent programming for sixteen hours each day cannot
serve a facilitation interest; such a ban preempts, rather than facilitates, parental control. See
ACT III, 58 F.3d at 670-71 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); see also C. Edwin Baker, The Evening
Hours During Pacifica Standard 7ime, 3 VrL SPORTS & Er. L.J. 45,56 (1996) (noting contra-
diction between the interests).
25 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996)
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)).
26 Id.; see infra subpart IV.B.
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via broadcast communications;27 the second prohibits the FCC from
censoring broadcast communications. 28 The Supreme Court has had
to step in to resolve the conflict between these provisions, which it did
for the first time in 1978.
A. George Carlin and the Seven Dirty Words
On a Tuesday afternoon in October 1973, a New York radio sta-
tion owned by the noncommercial Pacifica Foundation aired, as part
of a program about attitudes toward language, a twelve-minute mono-
logue by comedian George Carlin entitled "Filthy Words," a discus-
sion of the seven "words you couldn't say on the public . . .
airwaves. '29 A man who said he stumbled onto the broadcast on his
car radio while driving with his young son complained to the FCC.30
The Commission upheld the complaint, characterizing the language as
"patently offensive" and thus indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464.31 Pacifica appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which reversed the
decision of the Commission, with three separate opinions.32 The case
then went to the Supreme Court, the first and only case in which the
Court has dealt with the issue of indecent material in broadcasting.33
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, first resolved the in-
herent conflict between sections 326 and 1464, interpreting the restric-
tion against FCC censorship to mean the denial of "any power to edit
proposed broadcasts in advance and to excise material considered in-
appropriate for the airwaves. The prohibition, however, has never
been construed to deny the Commission the power to review the con-
tent of completed broadcasts .... ."34 While acknowledging that this
27 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994): "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined ... or imprisoned."
28 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1994): "Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give
... the power of censorship over the... communications ... "
29 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,729 (1978). The monologue was intended to satirize
societal attitudes about language and included repeated use of the seven words. The show was
preceded by a warning that the content might be offensive to some listeners. S=-u'iN, supra
note 3, at 209 n.168.
30 See PowF, supra note 4, at 186 (noting that the complainant was John R. Douglas, a mem-
ber of the national planning board of Morality in Media, an organization working to eliminate
indecency from mass media). Professor Powe said Douglas "would have listened, if at all, only
with the aim of finding what he did not wish others to hear." Professor Powe also noted the
"young son" was 15 years old. Id.
31 The Commission there established for the first time the legal definition of indecency. See
supra note 5. The Commission also emphasized that the monologue was broadcast during the
early afternoon, a time when children were likely to be in the audience. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
32 Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
33 For a discussion of the Pacifica case in the context of other FCC actions against radio
stations for broadcasting material about sex and drugs and of the congressional desire for the
Commission to "do something" about television content, see PowE, supra note 4, at 162-90.
34 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735.
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order "may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves," 35 Justice
Stevens held that in order to give meaning to both provisions, the cen-
sorship language of section 326 could not apply to the prohibition of
obscene, indecent, or profane material.36
The Court then turned to the First Amendment issue, holding
that although the speech in question was protected, such language and
references "surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment con-
cern." 37 The Court analyzed the Carlin monologue as if it were not
fully protected speech: "If there were any reason to believe that the
Commission's characterization [of the monologue] as offensive could
be traced to its political content ... First Amendment protection
might be required. But that is simply not the case. These words of-
fend for the same reasons that obscenity offends. '38
The Court then explained that different media receive different
levels of First Amendment protection: "[O]f all forms of communica-
tion, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amend-
ment protection. '39 The reasons for this distinction in the indecency
context were two-fold.
First, "broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of Americans," particularly in the home, where
"the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder. '40 Prior warnings, or simply turn-
ing the radio off, were insufficient to remedy the injury suffered from
hearing the dirty words.41 Second, "broadcasting is uniquely accessi-
35 Id. at 743.
36 Il. at 738.
37 Id. at 743.
38 Id. at 746. Justice Stevens cited Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), for
the proposition that "[sluch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
Note that the opinion did not command a majority on this point; only Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist joined this portion of the opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Black-
mun, said the Justices were not free to decide on the basis of its content which speech is most
valuable and hence deserving of more protection, and which is less valuable and hence deserving
of less protection. Ld. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The case did not turn on whether
Carlin's monologue was more or less valuable than a campaign speech. Id.
For another opinion by Justice Stevens according lesser protection to indecent speech, see
Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
39 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. Justice Stevens made much of the context in which speech occurs
as determinative of its level of protection, by distinguishing indecent language on the radio in
this case from the same language in a public courthouse in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22
(1971) (holding that wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" inside a
courthouse was protected speech). Id. at 747 n.25.
40 Id. at 749.
41 Id. at 748-49. Justice Stevens noted that the balance was tipped towards the speaker when
outside the home and that anyone who did not like some speech should turn away. This was
reversed inside the home, as illustrated by the greater privacy interest of a homeowner from
obscene phone calls. Id. at 749 n27. This problem is discussed infra, in subpart III.A.
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ble to children," 42 and "the government's interest in both the well-
being of its youth and in supporting parents' claim to authority in their
own household justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. '43
Justice Stevens responded in a footnote to the argument that the
emphasis on protecting children would infringe on the rights of adults
to hear the Carlin monologue, noting "[a]dults who feel the need may
purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear
these words." 44 Finally, Justice Stevens emphasized the "narrowness
of our holding," stressing that the monologue was not necessarily
banned from broadcast entirely, since the FCC had emphasized the
time of day the show was broadcast and the other unique facts of the
case.45
The FCC did not take Pacifica as a mandate to aggressively en-
force the rules against broadcast indecency.46 Broadcasters, playing it
safe, simply avoided repetitive use of the seven words from the Carlin
monologue,47 with a "safe harbor" after ten p.m., a time when few (or
fewer) children would be in the audience. 48 The Commission re-
frained from enforcing the indecency standard between 1978 and
1987.4
9
B. Action for Children's Television: The Nine Year Drama5 °
1. ACT L-In 1987, the Commission began applying the inde-
cency definition as a generic standard: "language or material that de-
picts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
42 Id. at 749.
43 Id. at 749-50 (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Powell's concurring opinion em-
phasized that the "result [in this case] turns ... on the unique characteristics of the broadcast
media, combined with society's right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be
inappropriate for their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by
such offensive speech in their homes." Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
44 Id. at 750 n.28.
45 Id. at 750.
46 In fact, the FCC disavowed an expansive interpretation of indecency in In re Application
of WGBH Education Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254 (1978) (ruling that Pacifica "affords
this Commission no general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or identical
to those in Pacifica are broadcast.... We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica
holding.").
47 Carlin had called the words in his monologue "the words you couldn't say on the public
... airwaves." Broadcasters' response to Pacifica showed Carlin was not only a "superb come-
dian; he was also a good prophet." PowE, supra note 4, at 186.
48 R.G. Passler, Comment, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts: George Carlin Revis-
ited-What Does the Future Hold for the Seven "Dirty" Words?, 65 TuLt L. REv. 131, 137 (1990).
49 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 913 (1992) [hereinafter ACT 11].
50 For a discussion of the first few years of the drama, see Passler, supra note 48, at 142-66.
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or excretory activities or organs." 51 The Commission issued three sep-
arate warnings against radio station broadcasts.5 2 The stations ap-
pealed the warnings to the D.C. Circuit in Action for Children's
Television v. FCC.53 The court, in an opinion by then-Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, first upheld the new, generic indecency standard,
holding that the Commission had explained adequately the reasons
for adopting this new enforcement standard because the old standard
had been "unduly narrow as a matter of law and inconsistent with its
obligation responsibly to enforce section 1464."54
The court also rejected a vagueness challenge to the standard.55
The generic definition was the same definition the Commission had
used in Pacifica, and although the Supreme Court had not specifically
addressed a vagueness challenge, the Court had quoted portions of
that standard with "seeming approval" and had affirmed the Commis-
sion's application of that standard.5 6 The D.C. Circuit thus "infer[red]
... that the [Supreme] Court did not regard the term 'indecent' as...
vague. '57 The court next repeated the litany that indecent speech is
constitutionally protected, but may be restricted or regulated consis-
51 See New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to all Broadcast and Amateur
Radio Licensees, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218, 1219 (1987); see also Passler, supra note 48, at
137-41.
52 In the first case, a radio station in Los Angeles was warned following a ten p.m. broadcast
of a scene from a play called "Jerker," in which two homosexual men discuss anal intercourse.
The play itself, about coping with AIDS, was geared to the city's gay population, and was pre-
ceded by a warning as to its content. The FCC warned the station that future broadcasts could
be actionable under the new, generic indecency standard. See Pacifica Found., 62 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1191 (1987).
The second warning went to a college station in Santa Barbara, California, which aired a
song after ten p.m. called "Makin' Bacon" containing references to sexual organs and activities.
The Commission again said a future broadcast, even after ten p.m., would be actionable. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1199 (1987).
The third action was against Infinity Broadcasting for a weekday morning broadcast of
Howard Stem's radio program containing sexual innuendo and double entendre, with references
to masturbation, ejaculation, and other sexual activities and organs. See Infinity Broad., 62 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1202 (1987).
For excerpts from the broadcasts, see Passler, supra note 48, at 137-38 nn. 34-39.
53 ACT 1, 852 F2d at 1332.
54 Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55 Id. at 1338.
56 Id. at 1339.
57 Id. at 1339. Judge Ginsburg added that "if acceptance of'indecent' as capable of surviving
a vagueness challenge is not implicit in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Authority and
welcome correction." Id. The Supreme Court formally accepted the indecency definition in
Denver Area Education Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374,2389-90 (1996) (rejecting
void-for-vagueness challenge).
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tent with the power of the state to control the conduct of children,
especially in unique media such as broadcast television and radio.58
Nevertheless, the court ultimately decided that the Commission
did not provide adequate factual or analytic foundation in setting the
time for the safe harbor for indecent programming and remanded the
cases for "thoroughgoing reconsideration of the times at which inde-
cent material may be aired." 59 The court demanded a "securely-
grounded channeling rule [that] would give effect to the government's
interest in promoting parental supervision of children's listening, with-
out intruding excessively upon the licensee's range of discretion or the
fare available for mature audiences and even children whose parents
do not wish them sheltered from indecent speech. '60
2. ACT II-.Congress responded by passing an amendment to a
1989 appropriations bill requiring the FCC to "promulgate regulations
in accordance with section 1464... to enforce the provisions ... on a
24-hour a day basis."' 61 The Commission then passed a total, 24-hour
ban on indecent programming on broadcast television and radio. 62 A
unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit rejected the absolute ban in
1991,63 holding that based on ACT I, "the Commission must identify
some reasonable period of time during which indecent material may
be broadcast," which means "the Commission may not ban such
broadcasts entirely."64
58 ACT 1, 852 F.2d at 1340 & n.12. The court also tried to work the issue of the merit of a
program into the standard: "[M]erit is properly treated as a factor in determining whether mate-
rial is patently offensive, but it does not render such material per se not indecent." Id. at 1340.
59 Id. at 1340-41. The court stressed the importance of a well-reasoned channeling analysis
and identification of some reasonable period of time in which indecent material may be broad-
cast "in view of the curtailment of broadcaster freedom and adult listener choice that channeling
entails." Id. at 1341.
60 Id. at 1344. This, of course, overlooks the problem Chief Judge Edwards would later ad-
dress in his ACT III dissent-if indecent material is channeled to certain times of day, parents
who wish their children to see it cannot do so for significant periods of time. Act 111, 58 F.3d at
670 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). But see Baker, supra note 24, at 46 (arguing that Pacifica implic-
itly approved channeling); see infra subpart IV.A.
61 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988).
The amendment was proposed by Senator Jesse Helms, who, ignoring the protected nature
of indecent speech, argued that there was no right to broadcast or receive indecent material on
public airwaves. He said that adults who want indecent material should purchase tapes and
records, go to theaters and night-clubs, or watch cable television. 134 CONG. REc. S9,911 (1988).
"If adults want this kind of trash they can go to a garbage dump," he added. Id. Senator Helms
also rejected the idea of channeling, saying "[g]arbage is garbage, no matter what the time of day
or night may be." Id.
62 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1989).
63 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1504.
64 Id. at 1509. "The fact that Congress itself mandated the total ban... does not alter our
view that ... such a prohibition cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id. The court also
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3. ACT IL -After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in ACT
II, Congress responded with the Public Telecommunications Act of
1992, part of which ordered the Commission to "promulgate regula-
tions to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent programming" between
six a.m. and midnight.65 This led to the latest scene in this drama, an
en banc decision of the D.C. Circuit that followed the same pattern
and reasoning as Pacifica and upheld, with modification, the channel-
ing regulations. 66 Judge Buckley, writing for an eight-judge majority,
began by following Pacifica for the proposition that broadcast receives
less protection than other media.67 Thus, "[w]hile we apply strict scru-
tiny to regulations of this kind regardless of the medium affected by
them, our assessment . . . must necessarily take into account the
unique context of the broadcast medium. '68 The court then focused
on two of the compelling interests asserted by the Commission: (1)
supporting parental supervision of their children; and, (2) concern for
children's well-being. 69
The court emphasized FCC findings about the prevalence of
homes in which children had radios or televisions in their own rooms
to show that real parental control over what their children saw was
impossible,70 and reaffirmed "that the Government has an independ-
ent and compelling interest in preventing minors from being exposed
to indecent broadcasts."'71 The court also found that the two asserted
interests were complementary and fully consistent with one another
because parents who did wish to expose their children to the material
would "have no difficulty in doing so through the use of subscription
and pay-per-view cable channels, delayed-access viewing using VCR
rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the indecency standard, relying on its ACT I
opinion three years earlier. Id. at 1507-08.
65 Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949, 954
(1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (Supp. IV 1992)). One exception in the Act permitted
indecent material beginning at ten p.m. on public broadcasting stations that went off the air at
midnight. 47 U.S.C. § 303(1).
The FCC responded to the mandate by amending 47 C.F.R. 73.3999 to set the safe harbor at
midnight to six a.m. 47 C.F.R. 73.3999 (1995).
A panel of the D.C. Circuit struck down the regulation. Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court vacated this decision in agreeing to a rehearing en
banc. 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
66 ACT 111, 58 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
The court summarily rejected another vagueness challenge to the definition of indecency, relying
on the prior ACT decisions. Id. at 659.
67 Id. at 659.
68 Id. at 660.
69 Id. at 660-61. The FCC asserted a third interest in protecting the home against intrusion
by offensive broadcasts, but the court did not address this interest because it found the other two
sufficient to support the regulation. Id. at 661.
70 Id. at 661.
71 Id. at 663.
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equipment, and the rental or purchase of readily available audio and
video cassettes." 72
The court then concluded that the ban was narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling interests. 73 Relying on FCC findings as to the
number of children in the audience during those hours, and the fact
that the number of children watching drops after midnight, the court
found that the rule "reduces children's exposure to broadcast inde-
cency to a significant degree." 74 Also, the restrictions did not "unnec-
essarily interfere with the ability of adults to watch or listen to such
materials both because [adults] are active after midnight and.., have
so many alternative ways of satisfying their tastes at other times. '75
Finally, the court-although recognizing the burden on the First
Amendment rights of adults-held that those rights must "yield to the
imperative needs of the young."76 The court did, however, find the
public broadcaster exception to be a "selective exemption" and or-
dered the FCC to apply the less restrictive, ten p.m. cut-off to all
broadcasters. 77
Today, no radio or television broadcaster may broadcast, between
the hours of six a.m. and ten p.m., programs containing "language or
material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offen-
sive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs." 78 These
regulations are based in large part on a government interest in pro-
tecting children.79 Analysis of content regulation in broadcasting is
clearly different than in other media and other areas of free speech
law. The next Part examines the dramatic degree to which the broad-
cast regulatory scheme departs from First Amendment and other con-
stitutional principles.
III. PROBLEMS wIr THE LAW OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
Indecent-but-not-obscene speech generally receives full First
Amendment protection,80 although judicial language has hinted at a
72 Id.
73 Id. at 667.
74 Id. at 655, 657.
75 Id. at 667.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 668-70.
78 New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to all Broadcast and Amateur Radio
Licensees, 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1218, 1219 (1987); see ACT III, 58 F.3d at 660.
79 ACT I1, 58 F.3d at 661.
80 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); ACT II, 58 F.3d at 659; see also Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2415 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (rejecting a rule of lesser protection
for indecent speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 761 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in
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lower level of protection.81 Even under Justice Scalia's sliding scale,
the types of programs at issue on radio and broadcast television still
should be fully protected.8 2 This Comment thus proceeds on the view
that indecent speech in broadcasting receives full First Amendment
protection.8 3
A. Pacifica as a First Amendment Anomaly
The current regulatory scheme surrounding broadcast indecency
is entirely the child of the Court's decision in Pacifica,84 so any effort
to change the law must begin there. This case has been repeatedly
distinguished, criticized, and ignored.85 It stands alone as a contradic-
part) (stating that the Court is not free to determine which speech deserves more or less protec-
tion on the basis of content alone).
81 See Sable, 492 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring) (proposing a sliding scale where the more
pornographic the indecent material, the less it is protected); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 (stating that
indecent material is protected, but that it "surely lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment
concern"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (stating
that protection of indecent material is wholly different and of a lesser magnitude than protection
of political speech); see also Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2391 (refusing to decide the question).
82 Indecent material in broadcasting involves, for example, dirty words, Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
730; sexual- or adult-oriented discussions, see Passler, supra note 48, at 137-42; see supra note 52;
or, in the case of television, some partial nudity, cf. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213 ("[A]II nudity
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors."). This is not the type of graphic sexuality gener-
ally associated with pornography. But see CATHARInE A. MAcKNNON, ONLY WORDS 22 (1993)
(defining pornography as any "graphic sexually explicit materials that subordinate women
through pictures or words").
83 Further, free speech theory would seem to require that any categories falling outside the
umbrella of the First Amendment be rigorously, narrowly defined and precisely limited in scope;
thus, new unprotected categories should not be created lightly. Se4 e.g., EMERSON, supra note
17, at 9-11; John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1501 (1975); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1, 10-11.
84 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
85 "[IThe Court's attempt to 'unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law' richly
deserves to be condemned and discarded as a derelict in the stream of law. To a good degree
this is what has happened." Winer, supra note 12, at 501-02 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). As one district judge said, "Time has not been kind to the Pacifica
decision." ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (3-Judge Panel) (opinion of
Dalzell, J.); see also PowE, supra note 4, at 209-11 (describing problems with Pacifica rationales);
SsmuTn , supra note 3, at 80 ("Most people with any First Amendment bones in their bodies are
troubled by the Pacifica case."); Baker, supra note 24, at 45 (agreeing with description of Pacifica
as "possibly the worst of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions").
For case law refusing to apply Pacifica to other media, see Sable, 492 U.S. at 127 (striking
down 24-hour ban on Dial-a-Por service because "private commercial telephone communica-
tions... are substantially different from the public radio broadcast"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (distinguishing receipt of offensive material by mail from
receipt by broadcast); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415,1419-20 (l1th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing cable
and broadcast); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851-52 (opinion of Sloviter, CJ.) (Internet not like
broadcasting); id. at 876-77 (opinion of Dalzell, J.). But see Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2388 ("[C]able
and broadcast television differ little, if at all.").
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tion, under which judicial and FCC decisions about broadcasting-
based on a perceived need to take affirmative steps to protect children
from hearing what the government believes is harmful-"continue to
deviate from constitutional norms" by limiting dissemination of ex-
pression, based on content, that otherwise would be constitutionally
protected.8 6
Even as to broadcasting, "[ilt takes a lot of extrapolation to move
from Pacifica to a full-blown theory of regulation." 87 Pacifica was an
emphatically narrow holding88 that should be limited to the facts of
that case-those seven words in a weekday afternoon radio broad-
cast.8 9 The Pacifica Court itself had intimated that Carlin's exact same
message could be made as long as it did not use those words.90 The
correctness of the result in Pacifica on its facts and context is, perhaps,
arguable;91 but it certainly should not support the generic definition
the FCC has applied since 1987 or the ban upheld in ACT 111.92
Moreover, while the rationales used in Pacifica to distinguish
broadcasting from other media initially seem convincing, they are in-
adequate to permit this lesser degree of First Amendment protection.
86 Lively, supra note 11, at 615; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[O]nly an acute ethnocentric myopia.., enables the Court to approve the censorship of com-
munications solely because of the words they contain"); Erznoznik, 422 U.S., 212 (holding that
Constitution does not permit the Court to protect some listeners from protected speech).
87 PowE, supra note 4, at 212.
88 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 127 (emphasizing the narrowness of
Pacifica's holding); Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74 (same); Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1990) (overturning state restriction on phone sex
messages); PowE, supra note 4, at 236 (arguing that extending Pacifica "wrenches [it] from its
facts").
89 "The Court's opinion is, in fact, narrowly confined to cases concerning both the precise
language conveyed and the particular medium of communication.... Pacifica is about dirty
words on radio." Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Marjorie L. Esterow, Censoring Indecent Cable
Programs: The New Morality Meets the New Media, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 606, 628 (1983); see
also Baker, supra note 24, at 45-46 (noting the narrowness of the Pacifica decision).
90 Justice Stevens noted that avoiding indecent language "will have its primary effect on the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that
cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n.18. This
implies that the same protected, indecent-but-not-obscene message, presented using different
language, should be permissible. Note that this still raises First Amendment troubles by ignoring
the fact that "one can[not] forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,26 (1971); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 773
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The idea that the content of a message ... can be divorced from the
words that are the vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious.").
91 Fifteen years after Pacifica, Justice Stevens argued that "the result might have been differ-
ent if the broadcaster had simply contended that the particular order was erroneous because the
evidence of actual or probable offense to the listening audience was so meager. Instead, how-
ever, the station took the position that the Commission was entirely without power to regulate
indecent broadcasting.... [A] less ambitious strategy might have better served the interests of
... the law." John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YA.E L.J. 1293, 1307-08 (1993).
92 See supra subpart II.B.
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Consequently, they have been widely and justifiably criticized.93
There is simply "no significant difference between the media. '94
Take, for instance, the unique accessibility of television to chil-
dren as a justification for greater government regulatory power over
broadcasting. Assuming accessibility means children can listen to the
radio or watch television without parental supervision, that does not
distinguish broadcasting from newspapers, magazines, or the U.S.
mail, which children can read as easily as they can see or hear an inde-
cent program on television.95 Likewise, the idea that television and
radio are intruders in the home is unrealistic. As Professor Powe ar-
gued, "Americans bring radios and television sets into their homes
because they desire them [and] there is no law requiring [the sets] be
turned on."' 96 The Court stated in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp. that the "First Amendment 'does not permit the government to
prohibit speech as intrusive unless the "captive" audience cannot
avoid objectionable speech."' 97 The recipient of objectionable mail
could and should simply throw it away; "the 'short... journey from
mail box to trash can.., is an acceptable burden, at least so far as the
93 See PowE, supra note 4, at 209-10 (arguing the distinctions "seem silly"); SprrzER, supra
note 12, at 6 ("[No other differences in the regulatory control of broadcast and print are justifi-
able."); id. at 123-30 (discussing the Pacifica rationales and arguing that they apply equally to
print); Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1497 (noting the "irrationality of granting broadcast
television less Frst Amendment protection than all other media"); Wmer, supra note 12, at 513
(arguing that the "asserted differences are... ephemeral"); see also ACT III, 58 F.3d at 673
(Edwards, CJ., dissenting) ("Whatever the merits of Pacifica ... 20 years ago, it makes no sense
now."). But see Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386-87
(1996) (applying Pacifica factors to cable); Msiow & LAMA-, supra note 22, at 127-28 (arguing
that Pacifica's reasoning is not obsolete).
94 Winer, supra note 12, at 523.
95 Pown, supra note 4, at 209; SPrrZER, supra note 12, at 123 (arguing that scanning the
broadcast dial is the same as flipping through pages in magazine). The Supreme Court expressly
rejected the application of the "uniquely accessible" rationale to the postal service. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,74 (1983) (invalidating statute that prohibited the unso-
licited mailing of contraceptive advertisements).
96 PowE, supra note 4, at 210. Professor Powe notes that books, which are bought or bor-
rowed and also voluntarily brought into the house, are not intruders and certainly not fit for
government censorship, id., so why should broadcast be fit for censorship? Professor Wmer
takes a harder tack, arguing that because the broadcast media come into the home where the
privacy right is greatest, the freedom of the willing listener from government intervention should
be greater. Winer, supra note 12, at 520.
Justice Brennan argues that listening to communications over the public airways is an ex-
pressive act by the listener. "[B]ecause the radio is undeniably a public medium, these actions
are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener, in an ongoing public
discourse." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Spitzer assessed Justice
Brennan's argument: "If Justice Brennan is correct, as he almost certainly is, then one could say
the same thing about subscribing to Penthouse magazine by mail. Similarly, if he is wrong,....
then the government may invoke these same ... interests to control the content of printed
publications." SPrrzER, supra note 12, at 120.
97 Bolger, 463 U.S. at 72 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980)).
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Constitution is concerned."' 98 The issue is why the journey to the gar-
bage pail is less burdensome than the equally short journey to the
tuning dial on a television or radio, especially when the tuning dial
now is operated by remote control.99
Further, television viewers or radio listeners are not prisoners in
their homes, forced to listen to indecent speech.100 Broadcast radio
and television may be distinguished from a true "home intruder,"
which the Court addressed in Frisby v. Schultz.101 The focused/gen-
eral distinction made in Frisby illustrates the fallacy in Justice Ste-
vens's analogy in Pacifica between an indecent radio broadcast and an
obscene phone call.10 2 Obscene phone callers are focused picketers,
annoying or harassing only the single person called; the caller's speech
arguably can be restricted in the name of protecting residential pri-
vacy. But broadcasting, which sends the signal over public airwaves in
a wide viewing or listening area to potentially millions of homes at
once, is the "more generally directed means of communication that
may not be completely banned."'10 3 A person scanning the dial to find
the desired station runs the risk of hearing unwanted material that is
sent to the general public.1°4
Professor Powe viewed the pervasive nature of broadcasting as an
issue of power. 0 5 The problem with this view is that Pacifica and the
warnings in ACT I dealt with radio, not television; Professor Powe
doubted anyone could "assert that radio is a powerful force in Ameri-
can life."'01 6 But broadcasting in general "radiated fear":
With broadcasting-specifically television (I think we have outgrown the
belief that radio is powerful)-we are not as sure what the medium is
doing to us, and so we attempt to regulate it to prevent it from doing
what we do not know it is doing. We may not know the consequences of
introducing television into our homes, but there appears to be a regula-
98 Id (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.
1967)).
99 Besides, one could avoid unwanted material, especially on television, by checking program
listings in advance or by not turning on the television until the desired channel was selected.
SpnzaR, supra note 12, at 123.
100 "As long as individuals have free will and television sets are equipped with on/off buttons
and channel selectors," Winer, supra note 12, at 513, the individual always can avoid objectiona-
ble speech on radio and television. "No viewer is a captive audience of either cable or broad-
casting, he can avoid or turn away from either with equal ease." Id. at 523.
101 487 U.S. 474,486 (1988). The Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited "focused picket-
ing," picketing narrowly directed at a specific household rather than the public. The ordinance
banned only those speakers whose purpose was to intrude upon the targeted resident, but not
those who sought to disseminate a general message to the public. I&
102 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 n.27.
103 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. Further, the listener who tunes in the radio or television is taking
part in this general public communication. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 SpIr'zEn, supra note 12, at 123.
105 PowE, supra note 4, at 211.
106 Id. at 212.
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tory consensus that we don't want those consequences to get out of
hand.... The fear may be irrational, but it is there nevertheless. It does
not justify regulation, but it does explain it.1 7
However, the power rationale for regulation actually inverts tradi-
tional free speech theories, which normally would favor greater First
Amendment rights for media with greater exposure or communicative
impact.'08
Despite the apparent similarities between broadcast and cable
television,109 lower courts have noted several ways in which they differ
and have granted cable television full First Amendment protection,
unfettered by Pacifica-type time restrictions. These differences in-
elude the fact that a cable user subscribes, pays a fee, and can cancel
the subscription at any time, while a broadcast television user does not
subscribe or pay a fee and cannot cancel.110 Additionally, cable may
utilize lockboxes, available free from the cable company, which allow
parents to "lock out" channels or programs they do not want their
children to see. 1' However, in Denver Area Education Telecommun-
cations Consortium v. FCC,112 a divided Supreme Court stated for the
first time that, in terms of intrusiveness and pervasiveness, "cable and
broadcast television differ little, if at all,"' n 3 and that the factors be-
hind the Court's opinion in Pacifica were present in the regulation of
indecent material on cable." 4
107 Id. at 214-15; see also Donald E. Lively, Fear and the Medi. A First Amendment Horror
Show, 69 Mnmq. L. Rnv. 1071,1080-91 (1985) (discussing the problems with regulating media out
of fear of their power).
108 See Wimer, supra note 12, at 526 (rejecting argument that "the very effectiveness of
speech" should be the "justification for according it less first amendment protection"); Lively,
supra note 11, at 619 (viewing this as "mock[ing] the notion of press freedom"); see also Denver,
116 S. Ct. at 2407 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (arguing that where government is concerned about technology's direction, "it
ought to begin by allowing speech, not suppressing it").
109 Since many broadcast channels are included on a cable system, most viewers do not know
of or care about the difference between broadcast and cable channels. MiNow & LAMAY, supra
note 22, at 134; see PowE, supra note 4, at 235-38.
110 See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167 (D. Utah
1982); see also Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1113 (D.
Utah 1985) (holding that "cable TV is not an intruder but an invitee"), affd, 800 F.2d 989 (10th
Cir. 1986), affd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987). According to one court, the distinctions between cable and
broadcast television reflect "[Il]evels and degrees of choice" available to a cable viewer, but not a
broadcast viewer. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1170.
111 Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1419 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985).
112 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
113 Id. at 2388.
114 Id. at 2386-87; see cases cited supra note 110. The application of Pacifica to cable was
especially surprising after Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994),
where the Court refused to apply the scarcity rationale and the "must-carry" rules to cable.
Writing for the Court in Denver, Justice Breyer distinguished the structural regulations at issue
in Turner from content regulation designed to protect children. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2388.
1207
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The ultimate effect of Denver is unclear. On one hand, the Court
seems to have resolved any distinction between cable and broadcast
television by reducing the First Amendment protection afforded cable
to the lower degree associated with broadcasting.115 Moreover, the
Denver Court advocated the use of a less protective level of scrutiny
than that typically associated with content-based regulation.116 On
the other hand, the Court nowhere said that cable, like broadcasting,
should receive lesser protection than print media; in fact, Justice
Breyer's plurality opinion took great pains to avoid a "rigid single
standard" or an analogy to any other media.117 Further, the three reg-
ulations at issue in Denver-two of which the Court struck down-
were far less restrictive than the sixteen-hour ban upheld in ACT
111.118 Thus, broadcasters could argue that because cable and broad-
cast differ little if at all, the Court must strike down any regulation
more restrictive than those at issue in Denver. This requirement
would invalidate a regulation that would totally ban indecent material
for sixteen hours of each day.
If broadcast content must be subject to some regulation, the regu-
latory scheme used should avoid arbitrary attention to ephemeral and
unique characteristics, like pervasiveness. Instead courts should focus
on pertinent issues to determine whether an interest is compelling,
whether regulatory means advance their ends, and whether less re-
strictive alternatives are available.119 There is no real difference be-
tween broadcasting and other media with respect to indecency
regulation and no reason for the Court to continue to recognize such
115 Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2386-88. The Court thus ignored numerous scholarly attempts to
limit Pacifica to broadcasting and fully protect speech on cable. Cf. Pown, supra note 4, at 235-
38; Krattenmaker & Esterow, supra note 89, at 627-33; Winer, supra note 12, at 504-11.
116 Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385 (noting that the regulation must address "an extremely impor-
tant problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restric-
tion on speech"). The application of this less-protective standard seems to create the same
problems as the unresolved paradox of strict scrutiny applied to a less-protected medium. See
ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 660. But see Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2406-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court applied essen-
tially the same standard of scrutiny as in other First Amendment cases, but created confusion
through the use of inferior synonyms). Furthermore, the Court has described the strict scrutiny
test several different ways. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1528-29.
117 Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385; see also id. at 2401-02 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that the
"appropriate category for cable indecency should be... contextually detailed").
118 The Denver Court upheld a regulation allowing a cable operator to bar material he "rea-
sonably believes" to be indecent from leased access channels. 116 S. Ct. at 2390. The Court
struck down two regulations: one required that all indecent programs be placed on separate
channels and blocked unless requested by viewers. Id. at 2391. The other allowed cable opera-
tors to bar indecent speech from all public access channels. Id. at 2396.
119 Lively, supra note 11, at 621. Furthermore, "[t]o minimize the possibility of a paternalistic
reversion .... it is essential to establish such liberty [to broadcast and receive indecent material]
as a function of the Constitution .... Effectuation of that end requires eliminating the unusual
order of First Amendment interests in favor of universal constitutional standards." Id. at 620.
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differences. 20 Beyond the issue of these media distinctions, the most
glaring problem with Pacifica and the regulatory scheme it has
wrought is the degree to which that scheme departs from First
Amendment theory and doctrine, which is the subject of the next sec-
tion of this Part.
B. Content Regulation of Broadcasting and the Constitution
Professor Jonathan Weinberg claims that the
inconsistency of our broadcast regulatory system with ordinary free
speech thinking... makes sense if one imagines ordinary free speech
thinking and broadcast regulatory thinking as reflecting two conflicting
worldviews.... The two worldviews are not easily reconcilable. There
does not seem to be any perfect solution that would mediate the two
approaches .... Ultimately, we can do no better than a second-best
solution.121
Unfortunately, by banning certain kinds of speech entirely from
the airwaves for all but eight hours each day, the regulation upheld in
ACT III is not a second-best solution; barring speech from the me-
dium for any length of time is a substantial and unacceptable devia-
tion from First Amendment norms.122
1. The Right to Hear. -The First Amendment freedom of
speech embraces a listener's right to hear and to receive information
and ideas.'23 The Supreme Court has moved from an exclusively
120 PoWE, supra note 4, at 209-10 (arguing that the Court's rationales are "puzzling" and
"troublesome" and fail to distinguish other media); Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1497
(The "Court will eventually feel forced to bring broadcast television and radio into the First
Amendment fold .... "); Winer, supra note 12, at 522-23 (arguing that "[t]here is no basis for
distinguishing between cable and broadcasting").
121 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1205-06. The former worldview is based on individualism,
nonpaternalism, and a sharp public-private distinction; the latter is based upon altruism, commu-
nal nature of values, and paternalism. Id.
Professor Weinberg argues that free speech theory, which is based on the former view, is too
detached from economic and social reality to be the sole guide for a broadcast regulatory
scheme, even if, as he agrees, the current scheme "works badly." 1d. at 1206. For the opposite
view, see CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 160-61 (1973) (Douglas, J., con-
curring) ("[O]ne hard and fast principle [of the First Amendment] is that Government shall keep
its hands off the press."); see also PowE, supra note 4, at 256 (arguing that "the old-fashioned
tradition of freedom [does not] look so bad"); Wmer, supra note 12, at 523-24 ("Once we begin
cleansing the television screen of all that is even momentarily objectionable .... the first amend-
ment is ... hopelessly eroded and the result is a worthless medium.").
122 See Lively, supra note 11, at 615. But see Baker, supra note 24, at 60, 64 (arguing that ACT
III was wrongly decided, but that a more restricted, limited channeling regulation would be
permissible).
123 EMERSON, supra note 17, at 649-50; Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and
Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 678, 679, 686 (1982)
(arguing that "value [underlying the First Amendment] may be fostered as much by the receipt
of expression as by the act of expressing" because there is "little doubt" that viewer or listener
benefits from watching or listening to a play or story). See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J.,
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speaker-centered view of the First Amendment to one in which the
rights of the listener are taken into account. 24 This shift is most pro-
nounced in the broadcast context.12 Professor Burt Neuborne dis-
cussed the potential difficulty of a listener-centered view of free
speech in that it
carries with it the dangerous potential for diluting the rights of speakers.
This is especially true when the interests of speakers and hearers are said
to diverge.... [W]e have not yet developed a metric to weigh the inter-
ests of speakers against the interest of hearers and have not decided who
should win when the interests diverge.126
The broadcast indecency context raises the more important issue
of who should win when the interests of different listeners within an
audience diverge. Ordinarily, the fundamental First Amendment pre-
sumption prevails: the speech must be disseminated and those lis-
teneers who do not want to hear must take some affirmative steps to
dissenting) (emphasizing the interests of listeners who wish to hear broadcasts the FCC deems
offensive); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (holding that Frst Amendment
freedom "embraces the right to distribute literature ... and necessarily protects the right to
receive it") (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court touched on this aspect of free speech in three cases. In Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Court invalidated a law requiring people who
wanted to receive mail labeled by the government as communist propaganda to specially request
it. Id. at 306-07. Justice Brennan, concurring, viewed the right to receive publications as the
type of fundamental right that made the express guarantees of the First Amendment meaningful.
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court invalidated a state law making private
possession of obscene materials by adults a crime, since it was "now well established that the
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas." Id. at 564.
In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School DisL No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
867 (1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.), Justice Brennan argued that the "right to receive
ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom." Id. at 867. The Court held that the school board authority to
remove books from the school library was limited by the First Amendment rights of students to
read these books. Id. at 871-72.
124 Burt Neuborne, Speech, Technology and the Emergence of a Tricameral Media: You Can't
Tell the Players Without a Scorecard, 17 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 17, 30 (1994). "Entire
categories of speech arose where the principal justification for the First Amendment protection
was the hearer's right to know. The net effect was a quantum shift in the free speech universe to
a greater concern with the interest of hearers." ld. at 30-31.
125 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the viewers
and listeners... which is paramount.") (citations omitted).
126 Neuborne, supra note 124, at 31. For examples of the Court's attempts to balance the
interests of speakers and listeners, see Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc, 114 S. Ct. 2516,
2526-30 (1994) (balancing the rights of protesters at abortion clinic with those of clinic patients
and staff); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (upholding a ban on residential picketing
that targets an individual but permits more general picketing). Efforts to set the time at which
indecent broadcasts will be banned also exemplify this balancing of interests. See, &g., ACT 111,
58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); ACT 1, 852 F.2d 1332, 1344
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
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avoid it.27 Conversely, in broadcasting, especially when children are
part of the viewing or listening audience, the opposite is the case: the
government's asserted interest in protecting children prevails over the
rights of those who wish to hear the same, constitutionally protected
material.128
Government efforts to regulate broadcast indecency under a pro-
tection interest should be sharply circumscribed by the "need to fit the
restriction pertaining to children into the system of freedom for
adults,"'129 and by the Supreme Court's warning in Butler v. Michi-
gan130 that government may not "reduce the adult population.., to
reading only what is fit for children."131 Unlike other forms of expres-
sion, such as books, magazines, and movies, it is difficult to withhold
broadcast programs from minors without restricting the expression at
its source.' 32 This emphasis on protecting children tips the balance
too far in one direction and restricts from adults too much protected
127 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
128 See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30,749-50 (holding that complaint of one parent and the
government's protection interest is sufficient to punish broadcaster for Carlin monologue); ACT
111, 58 F.3d at 656 (upholding ban on indecent material on radio and television before ten p.m.,
regardless of how many adults want to see such material). But see ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509
(rejecting 24-hour broadcast ban on indecent material).
129 EMERSON, supra note 17, at 502.
130 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
131 Id. at 383. To restrict adult access to speech solely to protect children was "to burn the
house to roast the pig." Id. The Court has reiterated this principle on several occasions. See
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1989) (quoting Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Butler); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) ("The
level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable
for a sandbox.").
Professor Emerson took this to mean that "while Butler stands, laws attempting to restrict
the availability of erotic materials for minors are likely to be ineffective." EMERSON, supra note
17, at 502. Professor Winer argued that regulation based on "[slolicitude for children... inevita-
bly abridges adults' First Amendment rights. .. ." Winer, supra note 12, at 521; see also Baker,
supra note 24, at 54-55 (channeling permissible if it does not "materially reduce the availability
of the material to adults").
132 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749. Thus, bookstores and movie theaters may restrict the access
of minors while still making the material available to adults. Id. Likewise, the availability of
free lock-boxes, or "parental keys," that could keep children out of the audience was a key focus
in distinguishing cable from broadcast. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1419 (11th Cir.
1985).
Professor Spitzer called these "institutional safeguards." SprrzER, supra note 12, at 125.
Changing the safeguards could alter the broadcast regulatory scheme. Technological advances,
such as the V-Chip included in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551,
110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)), provide this institutional safe-
guard for broadcasting by making it possible to screen out parts of the broadcast audience with-
out restricting speech at the source. See infra section IV.B.2. But see HAnAAN, supra note 14, at
178-79 (arguing that it is not a wise course to screen out of the speech audience only those
incapable of making judgments because of age, especially since younger children likely would
not understand material such as the Carlin monologue); Balkin, supra note 5, at 1164 (expressing
fear for technology that filters information in the media).
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speech; if a substantial number of children are in the potential audi-
ence at a given time, the regulation stands.133
In upholding, as modified, the pre-ten p.m. ban in ACT III, the
D.C. Circuit focused on the data collected by the FCC as to the
number of children (defined as those under age eighteen) in the audi-
ence during the times of the ban, and found those numbers substantial
enough to create a "reasonable risk that large numbers of children
would be exposed to... indecent material." Thus, the data supported
the restriction of such material.134 The court overcame similar statis-
tics about the number of adults in the audience at those times by argu-
ing that (1) adults have "alternative means of satisfying their interest
in indecent material,"' 35 and (2) any chilling effect on adult speech
was inherent in section 1464 and Pacifica.136
The apparent ease with which the D.C. Circuit brushed aside le-
gitimate First Amendment concerns illustrates how this system of reg-
ulation "starkly and gratuitously" conflicts with conventional free-
speech philosophy.137 First, the availability of alternative media in
which speech may be heard is not a consideration when the govern-
ment makes a content-based regulation of speech.138 Second, this ap-
proach fails to distinguish between general access by children and
133 See ACT III, 58 F.3d at 667 ("[M]arginal convenience of some adults ... yield[s] to the
imperative needs of the young."); see also Winer, supra note 12, at 521-22 ("Restricting inde-
cency to late evening and early morning hours, when most people are asleep, also substantially
intrudes on the rights of both programmers and viewers by effectively precluding protected
expression.").
134 ACT 1i, 58 F.3d at 665.
135 Id. at 666. The Pacifica Court expressed this same idea that "[a]dults who feel the need
may purchase tapes and records or go to theaters and nightclubs to hear those words." Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
136 ACT Ii, 58 F.3d at 666.
137 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1205.
138 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391 (1996) (ar-
guing that content-based regulation must be the "least restrictive alternative"); Sable Communi-
cations of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (stating that a content-based regulation
must be the "least restrictive means to further the articulated interest"). Further, the Court has
declared that exercise of liberty of expression in appropriate places should not be abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised elsewhere. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 556 (1975). The choice of the manner in which a message is received is one the First
Amendment prohibits the government from making. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
The availability of alternative media is part of the test for content-neutral regulations, those
not justified by reference to the content or subject matter of the regulated speech. See Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[R]estrictions [must be] 'justified without ref-
erence to the content of the regulated speech ... and ... leave open ample alternative channels
for communication ....') (citations omitted); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1980) (upholding restrictions on speech that are not based on the content
of the message and leave open ample alternative channels of communication); cf. Redish, supra
note 3, at 117 (arguing that courts should subject all restrictions on expression to critical
scrutiny).
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unsupervised access.139 Professor Winer argues that when "children
are unsupervised, program guides and the electronic technology avail-
able for both cable and broadcasting can provide the desired con-
trol."'14 Third, the ACT III court ignored the fundamental First
Amendment presumption of allowing expression for willing viewers
and requiring unwilling viewers to avert their eyes, turn the television
off, or deal with the brief affront to their sensibilities.141
2. The Rights of Parents.-One "difficulty with government cen-
sorship of communication to children is the thorny problems it creates
in the delicate relationships between and among parents, children, and
the state. Few would dispute the right of parents to do what they can
... to control the communications environment of their minor off-
spring."'142 The Supreme Court has long recognized the liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their
children as they see fit.143
Certainly, this right includes deciding what their children should
and should not watch on television, free from government interfer-
ence.144 The key question is what happens when some parents (or
139 The majority in ACT 111 answered this criticism by finding that there was no real adult
supervision, because most children had televisions and radios in their own rooms and tended to
watch or listen alone, without parental supervision. 58 F.3d at 661 (citing statistics); see supra
section II.B.3. But, Professor Winer argued, "regulations ... cannot be justified on the basis of
what parents choose to do or fail to do." Winer, supra note 12, at 522. Instead, the "Commis-
sion assumes that parents are... inept at... parenting...." ACTl11, 58 F.3d at 679 (Edwards,
C.., dissenting).
140 Wrier, supra note 12, at 522-23. The "availability of a simple lock to prevent all un-
supervised television watching, even without more refined technology, should be an adequate,
less restrictive means of control sufficient to preclude broader government regulation." Id. at
523.
141 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (arguing that recipients of
objectionable mailings may avert their eyes); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("'The radio can be turned off'.. . with a minimum of effort.") (citations omitted); see also
Redish, supra note 19, at 624 (arguing that courts should strike the balance in favor of letting
speech be heard); Wmer, supra note 12, at 523 (arguing that it is better to preserve the First
Amendment at the expense of a brief incident of offense to sensitive individuals). See supra note
19 and accompanying text.
142 HAIMAN, supra note 14, at 179; Winer, supra note 12, at 521 ("[R]egulation... improperly
usurps a discretionary parental function with broad governmental fiat."); ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 679
(Edwards, CJ., dissenting) ("Government does not generally tell parents what speech their chil-
dren should and should not hear.").
143 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature of
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right ... to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)
("This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate."); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968) ("[P]arents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic to the structure of our society.").
144 See Winer, supra note 12, at 522:
[P]arents can more precisely control what their children watch and appropriately balance
the rights of adults and the interests of children... concerning household viewing habits,
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even a majority of parents) demand the government interfere and
help them by banning some speech from the airwaves. Professor
Haiman argued that "it may be impossible for the state to assist one
group of parents... without simultaneously interfering with the rights
of other parents who may want a broader exposure for their offspring.
That is precisely the effect when a particular communication is cut off
at its source by government censorship."' 145 Justice Brennan recog-
nized this point in his Pacifica dissent, arguing that the principle of
parental rights
supports a result directly contrary to that reached by the Court....
[P]arents, not the government, have the right to make certain decisions
regarding the upbringing of their children. As surprising as it may be to
individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find Mr.
Carlin's unabashed attitude towards the seven "dirty words" healthy
.... Such parents may constitute a minority of the American public, but
the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right... does not
alter the right's nature or its existence. Only the Court's regrettable de-
cision does that.146
If, on the other hand, the government truly has any interest in facili-
tating parental control over their children's viewing habits,147 it cannot
achieve that interest by "making completely unavailable to adults ma-
terial which may not constitutionally be kept even from children." 148
not only with regard to sexual material but also as to excessive or graphic violence or other
matters of individual sensibilities .... Thus, regulations that would exclude or limit constitu-
tionally protected programming for adults cannot be justified on the basis of what parents
choose to do or fail to do.
See also Miuow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 164 ("[P]arents must... take primary responsibil-
ity for what their children see on television.").
145 HAIMAN, supra note 14, at 180; see Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
Under Lamont, the First Amendment presumption should be in favor of the speech and should
require the parent seeking to limit his child's access to take affirmative measures in that regard.
ld. at 307. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text. The fact that the ban upheld in ACT
III shifts the presumption to require the willing parents to take extraordinary steps to enable
their children see or hear the programs again shows how unnecessarily far it diverges from First
Amendment protections.
146 Pacifica, 438 U.S., 769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Chief Judge Edwards stated in
ACT II, "'[M]y right as a parent has been preempted, not facilitated, if I am told that certain
programming will be banned ... from my television."' 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J.,
dissenting)). See id. at 680 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe FCC has preempted, not facili-
tated, parental control .. ."); see also Baker, supra note 24, at 57 ("[C]omplete ban ... would
thwart, not aid... parents."); Balkin, supra note 5, at 1139 ("Parents do not want the govern-
ment deciding what is best for their children.").
147 The FCC asserted facilitation as a complementary state interest in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
749-50, and in ACT II, 58 F.3d at 660-61. But see ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 678 (Edwards, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the two interests are irreconcilably in conflict); Baker, supra note 24, at
56-57 (showing why the two interests conflict); see infra section IV.A.1.
148 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 679 (Edwards, C.J.,
dissenting) ("A complete ban on indecent broadcasts does not facilitate the variety of American
parents in supervising their children's exposure to broadcasting.").
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3. Limitation on the Protection Interest. -The government's pri-
mary asserted interest in broadcast indecency cases has been protect-
ing unsupervised children's exposure to indecent material.149 But the
government may not "act in loco parentis to deny children's access
contrary to parents' wishes."' 50 Thus, the government's "independent
interest in the well-being of its youth"''1 should be sharply limited. A
closer look at the cases that have developed the protection interest in
the First Amendment realm reveals that the interest should not sup-
port a ban on protected speech on broadcast television and radio that
adults may want to hear or see; the FCC's reliance on a protection
interest when regulating broadcast indecency for a mixed audience of
children and adults is misplaced.'5 2
Ginsberg v. New York, 53 the leading case on this point, dealt with
material that was obscene with respect to children, and thus was not
constitutionally protected. 54 Because this material lacked constitu-
tional protection, it could have been proscribed entirely.'55 Con-
versely, indecent material may not be banned entirely 56 even from
children. 57 It is thus impossible to create from Ginsberg a general,
independent governmental interest in shielding children from pro-
tected speech. In New York v. Ferber,'58 where the Court upheld a
conviction for the distribution of child pornography, the government's
interest in protecting children was geared toward preventing child ex-
ploitation and abuse in the production of the material, not in shielding
children or adults from exposure to the material itself.' 59 Thus, Fer-
ber, like Ginsberg, does not support a government interest in shielding
children from constitutionally protected speech.
The one situation in which the protection interest perhaps may be
asserted to control indecent speech is in public schools. Thus, in
149 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50; ACT II1, 58 F.3d at 663; see supra Part II.
150 ACT , 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted); see also Winer, supra
note 12, at 522 ("Parents are best able to make individualized discriminating judgments concern-
ing household viewing habits.").
151 ACT II, 58 F.3d at 663 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)).
152 Attorneys for ACT made this argument unsuccessfully in the en banc rehearing in ACT
IlL Reply Brief of Petitioners at 4 & n.4, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1092), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). But see MiNow & LAMAY,
supra note 22, at 131 (discussing the "child's First Amendment" that requires different
standards).
153 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
154 ld. at 641.
'55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
156 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509.
157 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
158 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159 Id. at 756-58. In fact, the Court conceded that the same material, produced without the
use of children, would be constitutionally protected. Id. at 765.
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Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,160 the Court upheld the pun-
ishment of a high school student for an indecent speech made at a
school assembly, emphasizing "the obvious concern on the part of par-
ents, and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children
... from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.' 61
However, three aspects of Fraser prevent it from providing a general
protection interest for use in regulating broadcast indecency for a
mixed audience.
First, because the school was acting in loco parentis, the school
had assumed the parental function and could exercise greater control
over what speech the students heard without improperly usurping the
parental function. 162 Second, the speech in question "undermine[d]
the school's basic education mission," so the restriction on the speech
was not necessarily based on a protection interest.163 Third, and most
importantly, the audience in Fraser consisted of students, so there was
no possibility of infringing adult free speech rights; Butler v. Michi-
gan'64 was not implicated. Thus, whatever protection interest was at
work in Fraser cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be car-
ried over to the regulation of broadcasting.165
As discussed previously, as a matter of First Amendment theory,
the best solution understands that "[m]aterial that does not sink to the
level of obscenity is deemed not to pose a sufficient threat to society
or its morals to justify regulation" and thus cannot be curtailed.16 6
160 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
161 Id. at 684. The student had made a speech filled with sexual innuendos and double enten-
dres. Id. at 677-78, 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
162 See Winer, supra note 12, at 521 (arguing that restricting speech based on solicitude for
children "improperly usurps a discretionary parental function").
163 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. In fact, Justice Brennan expressly rejected the Court's suggestion
that the school could punish the speaker in the name of protecting younger students. Ild. at 689
n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). He stressed that the decision was limited to a situa-
tion where the school was teaching a legitimate lesson about public discourse or attempting to
maintain civil discourse. Id. at 688-89 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
Note that the control a public school administration may have over speech is not absolute.
See Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871-72
(1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (holding that school board may not remove non-curric-
ulum books from school library simply because board members dislike the ideas contained in
those books); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that school administration may not bar students from wearing black armbands as silent,
non-disruptive anti-war protest).
164 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding that government may not "reduce the adult population
... to reading only what is fit for children"). See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
165 But see MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 131 ("[Cjonsiderations arise where children
are involved that do not arise with adults. Those considerations.., are always present, always
will be,... no matter what the medium.").
166 Winer, supra note 12, at 525; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing
that since Carlin's monologue was not obscene, the Commission lacked authority to regulate it);
see also supra note 16.
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But that is politically unacceptable to government regulators when
children are involved. Complete regulatory freedom is unlikely, so
the key is to devise the second-best system,167 a regulatory scheme
that is more in line with First Amendment theory and doctrine than
the present scheme. Pacifica and the sixteen-hour ban upheld in ACT
III failed to establish that second-best solution; no law that entirely
bans protected speech from the medium for any length of time can be
that solution. The reasons given to distinguish broadcasting from
other media simply do not justify differential treatment. Even assum-
ing that some differential treatment was acceptable, this Comment ar-
gues that the departure from First Amendment doctrine and theory is
unacceptable. Part IV proposes necessary changes to the law, outlin-
ing a new, second-best solution to the problem of regulating indecent
broadcasting.
IV. CHANGING THE LAW OF BROADCAST INDECENCY
The first step of any solution is to grant broadcasting the same
First Amendment protection as other media.168 Scholarly criticism
has "drive[n] home the irrationality of granting broadcast television
less First Amendment protection than all other media.' 69 With full
First Amendment protection granted to broadcasting, the usual free
speech doctrines, values, and principles should control, requiring that
speech get out to willing listeners, since it is "better to preserve First
Amendment freedoms, even at the expense of some brief incidents of
offense to sensitive individuals.' u70
Such a solution is rendered incomplete by the Supreme Court's
decision in Denver Area Education Telecommunication Consortium v.
FCC,171 which applied Pacifica to the regulation of cable indecency
and signaled a reluctance to eliminate Pacifica's rationales.172 Thus,
while the Court should reject the distinction between broadcast and
other media, the Court must do more to ensure that indecent material
on broadcast receives full First Amendment protection. Subpart A
examines what the second-best solution might entail; subpart B ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of the V-Chip law, concluding that this law
is the second-best solution for the regulation of broadcast indecency.
167 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1205-06; see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
168 "lit is essential to establish such liberty as a function of the Constitution." Lively, supra
note 11, at 620; see discussion supra subpart III.A.
169 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1497; see ACT II, 58 F.3d at 676-77 (Edwards, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[C]ritical underpinnings of the decision are no longer present. Thus, there is no
reason to uphold a distinction between broadcast and [other] media pursuant to a bifurcated
First Amendment analysis."); see also supra notes 93-94.
170 Winer, supra note 12, at 523; see supra subpart III.B.
171 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.).
172 Id. at 2386-87.
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A. Elements of the Second-Best Solution
Laws regulating indecent speech on radio and broadcast televi-
sion are content-based regulations on protected speech that must
"promote a compelling [government] interest [through] the least re-
strictive means to further the articulated interest."'173 The second-best
solution thus requires that the government rely on a different compel-
ling interest and use different regulatory means to achieve that
interest.
1. Facilitation Interest. -The Court first must recognize that
there is no compelling, independent government interest in protecting
children from the broadcast of constitutionally protected speech
geared to an audience comprised of both adults and children.174 In-
stead, the government's exclusive interest should be in "facilitat[ing]
parental supervision of the programming their children watch and
hear. '175 All statutes and administrative regulations covering inde-
cent material on broadcast television and radio must be the least re-
strictive means to serve that single interest.176
Chief Judge Harry Edwards has been a leading proponent of this
point: "[T]he state's interest in facilitating parents' ability to control
how much [indecent] programming their children watch is compelling.
The state's compelling interest lies not in protecting children, but in
173 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
174 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) ("Speech that is neither
obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed
solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for
them."). Unfortunately, the Court last term reaffirmed that interest. See Denver, 116 S. Ct. at
2391 ("[P]rotection of children is a 'compelling interest."'); id. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Congress does have, however, a
compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech.").
175 ACT II, 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has accepted
facilitation as a compelling interest, holding in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968),
that the parents' authority over their children means "parents ... who have this primary respon-
sibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of
that responsibility."
176 The government should not be able to assert both interests side-by-side, as it did in
Pacifica and ACT III. The two interests generally cannot stand together, since they support
different laws and usually are in "fundamental tension." Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at
1562-63; see ACT I1, 58 F.3d at 678-79 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (the Commission "cannot
simultaneously... facilitate parental supervision... and.., protect all children."); Baker, supra
note 24, at 56-58 (discussing conflict between the two interests).
A protection interest could be (and has been) used to support some type of ban on speech,
while a facilitation interest supports a scheme that provides information, technology, or both, to
enable parents to better determine what they and their children can and cannot see. Since the
ban on protected speech is unacceptable under First Amendment doctrine, see supra subpart
III.B., the government should assert only the facilitation interest in supporting regulations.
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protecting parenting."'77 Edwards elaborated on the differences be-
tween these interests:
Parents are entitled to ... assess whether and how to regulate the televi-
sion watching of their children. It does not matter that some parents
might elect to forbid their children from watching a show.., or that
some parents may elect to set no rules; that is their right. Indeed, par-
ents may do what the government may not do-adopt an overbroad pro-
phylactic rule banning their children from watching any program....
The point is that [such] a regulation ...undoubtedly will facilitate
parenting.178
Edwards has made similar arguments from the bench. Dissenting
in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC,179 he wrote:
[M]y right as a parent has been preempted, not facilitated, if I am told
that certain programming will be banned from my... television. Con-
gress cannot take away my right to decide what my children watch ....
But Congress surely can, I think, act to help me implement the decisions
that I make as a parent. 180
Edwards elaborated more fully on this point in his dissent from
the en banc decision in ACT III, rejecting the flat six a.m. to ten p.m.
ban as a means to serve a facilitation interest.' 8 ' First, addressing the
fact that the FCC had asserted protection of children in support of the
ban, he said: "[N]ot every parent will decide.., that the best way to
raise its child is to have the Government shield children... from
indecent broadcasts.... A complete ban ... does not facilitate the
variety of American parents in supervising their children's exposure to
broadcasting."' 82
He next criticized the argument that real parental control is
impractical:
[T]he Commission assumes that parents are unavailable or inept at the
task of parenting, and essentially establishes itself as the final arbiter
.... In so doing, the Government tramples heedlessly on parents' rights
to rear their children .... [I]f facilitating parental supervision means
177 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1563.
178 Id. at 1564.
179 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd in par4 rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
180 Id. at 145-46 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
181 ACT Ii, 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting).
182 Id. at 678-79 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting). Edwards conceded that there may be occasions
when the two interests work in tandem, as in Pacifica, in which a parent complained about the
broadcast and the FCC agreed. Id. at 679. However, when parental preferences conflict with
the government, parental preferences should prevail absent evidence of harm to the child. Id. at
682; see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (government cannot override rights
of parents who want their children to hear Carlin's monologue); see also HAimAN, supra note 14,
at 180 (when government agrees with some parents, it may disagree with others); see supra sec-
tion III.B.2.
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allowing parents to run the household in the manner they choose, then
the FCC has preempted, not facilitated, parental control.'
8 3
Edwards concluded, "[ilt would be hard to object to some sort of
regulation of indecency in broadcast as well as other media were it
narrowly tailored to facilitate parental supervision of children's expo-
sure to indecent material."'1 4 That is what the second-best solution
must do.
2. Institutional Safeguards.-A facilitation interest is furthered
by altering "institutional safeguards" and enabling parents to better
control what their children see and hear on television or the radio. 85
One such safeguard is the creation and use of lock-out technology that
enables parents to block particular programs or channels from being
shown at particular times.1' Lock-out technology is a "glorified on-
off switch,"'187 allowing a viewer to keep an indecent broadcast out of
his home altogether, whether because he does not want to see it or,
more likely, because he does not want his children to see it.188
The advantage to such technology is that it is consistent with the
fundamental First Amendment presumption that the program should
be broadcast, and it is up to the unwilling viewer or parent to take
affirmative steps to avoid that program. 8 9 One scholar defended
lock-out technology by saying that it
has been for many years the fond wish of many First Amendment schol-
ars, who worry that broadcast regulations designed to protect children
183 Act 111, 58 F.3d at 679-80 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 682. A flat ban, even for less that 24-hours, is not the least restrictive means to serve
a facilitation interest. Id. at 682-83; see Baker, supra note 24, at 57 (arguing that a complete ban
would not aid parents who might want their children to be exposed to a program). Rather, a
facilitation interest requires that speech be available in the medium, and that decisionmaking
power be placed in parents' hands. See supra note 19.
185 Cf. SprrzaR, supra note 12, at 125.
186 Pre-program warnings, or warnings published in program guides, as to the content of the
program would seem to be another effective institutional safeguard that would enable unwilling
parents and viewers to avert their eyes. But the radio programs at issue in Pacifica and ACT I
were preceded by similar warnings. See Passler, supra note 48, at 137-38, yet courts refused to
accept warnings as effective. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49; MINow & LAMAY, supra note 22,
at 23-24. Perhaps if the Court will reconsider the lesser protection for broadcasting, it will accept
a system of warnings. See supra subpart I.A.
187 MINow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 110. This brings to broadcast television a version of
the lock-boxes that have been in use for cable television and which were a main reason cable had
not suffered from Pacifica-type rationales and time restrictions. See Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415,
1419-21 (11th Cir. 1985); Winer, supra note 12, at 504-06. But see Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2388
(stating that cable and broadcast are indistinguishable).
188 Because such technology enables a viewer to effectively turn a station off before he suffers
the affront to his sensibilities, it makes stronger the argument, rejected in Pacifica, that "one may
avoid further offense by turning off the radio." 438 U.S. at 748-49.
189 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 19 & 127 and
accompanying text.
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infringe on the First Amendment rights of adults.... [This technology]
... mak[es] it possible to transfer what courts call the "plain-brown
wrapper" principle from print to television. Books, magazines and the
like that are clearly not intended for children may be distributed to
adults simply by concealing their contents .... [Lock-out technology]
would similarly extend the reach of free expression on television, al-
lowing adults to watch whatever suited them while effectively eliminat-
ing children from the audience. 190
The key to these institutional safeguards is that all control over what
material may be seen or heard is placed with the parents or viewers to
use the technology or not. 91
3. An Alternative Soltion.-Professor C. Edwin Baker argued
that the solution to the regulation of broadcast indecency was "re-
stricted channeling-a ban that would not extend to the evening when
a parent is more likely to be at home and potentially able to supervise
children in the house."' 92 Professor Baker argued that a ban during
those hours when parents are not at home, mainly regular working
hours, would not significantly impair receipt of the speech, and thus
would be an acceptable solution. 193
Professor Baker's proposal has several problems. First, it imper-
missibly departs from First Amendment doctrine by imposing a re-
striction on the time at which protected speech can be made based on
the content of that speech.194 The second, and greater problem, is that
190 MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 110.
191 See id. at 110-11 (rejecting arguments that enabling parents to monitor their children's
television viewing is unconstitutional); Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1564. Lock-out
technology has the further advantage of enabling the government to assist one group of parents
in strictly controlling what their children see without simultaneously interfering with the rights of
parents who want to give their children broader exposure to speech. See HAIMAN, supra note 14,
at 180.
192 Baker, supra note 24, at 60. Professor Baker suggested that banning indecency during the
afternoons would be acceptable, but the ban must end by six or eight p.m. Id. at 55. Thus, he
argued ACT III was wrongly decided but only because the time of the ban was too broad. Id. at
64.
193 Id. at 57-58.
194 Time, place, or manner restrictions must be content-neutral, that is justified without refer-
ence to the content or subject matter of the regulated speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
293 (1984)); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (upholding city
zoning of indecent speech based on "secondary effects" not associated with the message of that
speech); see also Thrner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994) (discussing when a
regulation is content-neutral). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,70-71
(1976) (upholding city restriction on the places for indecent speech because society's interest in
protecting indecent expression is of a lesser magnitude than its interest in untrammeled political
debate). The regulation Professor Baker proposes, aimed at indecent speech alone and justified
by the message of that speech and its supposed harm to children, is content-based and thus
impermissible as a time, place, or manner restriction. See also Edwards & Berman, supra note 3,
at 1504-05 (concluding that such regulations are content-based).
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there simply is no time at which an insignificant number of adults will
be in the audience; there are adults who do not work and who are in
the viewing or listening audience during the afternoon hours or nearly
any other time of day.195 Thus, Professor Baker's proposed regulation
suffers from the same basic problem as does the ACT III ban: it will
reduce the level of discourse during that time to what would be "suita-
ble for a sandbox,"'196 thereby restricting adult viewers' access to pro-
tected expression. 197 Alternatively, this proposed scheme would
prevail over the authority of those parents who are at home in the
afternoon and can supervise their children's viewing.198 Either way,
this is not the second-best solution to the problem of broadcast inde-
cency. Professor Baker's proposal assumes that it is "entirely appro-
priate that the marginal convenience of some adults be made to yield
to the imperative needs of the young."'199 This Comment disagrees.
The answer instead is that government may not stop protected
speech at the source or prohibit it from reaching the broadcast air-
waves at any time. To do so would be to "advance public interests by
means that suppress protected speech," something Professor Baker
agrees that the government cannot do.2oo The second-best solution
thus must adhere to the First Amendment presumption of allowing
speech to be heard, by permitting the speech to be broadcast, and
then providing ways for parents or unwilling viewers to limit access to
that speech.20'
B. Creating the Second-Best Solution: The V-Chip and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
Congress finally created the second-best solution with the so-
called V-Chip provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.202 It
195 The one possible exception to this is Saturday mornings, a time at which broadcasters are
showing cartoons to appeal directly to young audiences.
196 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
197 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 774-75 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Winer,
supra note 12, at 521-22; see also supra section III.B.1.
198 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 769-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ACTIIN, 58 F.3d at 678-79 (Edwards,
C.J., dissenting); see Winer, supra note 12, at 521 (arguing that such a scheme usurps parental
function); see also supra section III.B.2.
199 ACT III, 58 F.3d at 667.
200 Baker, supra note 24, at 64; see also EMERSON, supra note 17, at 17 ("[G]overnent may
protect or advance other social interests... but not by suppressing expression.").
201 See supra note 19.
202 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139 (1996) (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)). Congress had been considering a lock-out technology law for
several years. See H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
The V-Chip law finally passed was part of a comprehensive overhaul of federal Telecommu-
nications law signed into law by President Clinton on March 8,1996. The purpose of the law was
"to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework" for advanced tele-
communication and information technologies. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996). The
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utilizes lock-out technology, is based on a facilitation interest, and it
supports the fundamental First Amendment presumption of allowing
protected speech to be disseminated.
1. Provisions of the V-Chip Law.-The law mandates the use of
lock-out technology, requiring that all televisions larger than thirteen
inches be built with circuitry that will enable a parent to block a pro-
gram or station. 20 3 The law gives the broadcast industry one year to
create and implement a system for rating programs and transmitting
that rating with the broadcast signal.204 The ratings requirement may
be eliminated if and when technology develops that "enables parents
to block programming based on identifying programs without
ratings."205
Congress also expressly based the law on a facilitation interest.
Congress provided findings that parents "strongly support technology
that would give them greater control to block video programming in
the home; '20 6 that there is "a compelling governmental interest in em-
powering parents to limit the negative influences of video program-
ming; '20 7 and that providing parents with the technological tools to
block such programming is a narrowly tailored means of achieving
that interest.208 Such findings show Congress inching towards a reali-
zation that the government's role should not be to protect children by
law included provisions creating open competition for local telephone service, § 102; allowing
local telephone companies to provide long-distance service, § 151; allowing telephone companies
to provide cable service, § 302; allowing telephone companies to provide video service, § 651;
relaxing ownership restrictions and other regulations for broadcasting, §§ 201-202; and restrict-
ing indecent speech on the Internet, § 502. The Internet provisions were struck down by a three-
judge panel in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
203 § 551(C), 110 Stat. at 141.
204 § 551(e), 110 Stat. at 142. If the industry does not create and implement a ratings scheme,
or some equally effective non-ratings-based blocking scheme within one year, the FCC is given
the power to create an advisory committee--consisting of industry, parent, and public interest
groups-to reconunend guidelines and procedures for rating and transmitting programs.
§ 551(b), 110 Stat. at 140-41. In either case, ratings may not take into account political or reli-
gious content. Id. But see Balkin, supra note 5, at 1168-69 (arguing that political judgments
unavoidably enter the ratings process).
205 § 551(d)(4)(A), 110 Stat. at 141. Sponsors of the Act indicated that acceptable technology
could screen by program, by rating, or by time. See 141 CONG. REc. E1565, E1566 (dally ed. July
31, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey). Technology already exists that can block entire channels
for periods of time without ratings. MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 165; see also Lawrie
Mifflin, The First Devices to Block TV Programs with Sex or Violence Ratings Might be Months
Away, N.Y. TiMs, Mar. 18, 1996, at D7.
206 § 551(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 140.
207 § 551(a)(8), 110 Stat. at 140.
208 § 551(a)(9), 110 Stat. at 140.
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banning otherwise protected speech,20 9 but to enable parents to assert
control over what their children see in the home.210
In December 1996, industry leaders announced a ratings system
based on age appropriateness. 21' The industry scheme employs a
scale ranging from TV-Y for all children to TV-M for mature audi-
ences; TV-14, meaning inappropriate for children under fourteen
years of age, likely would be the most common rating for prime time
programs, soap operas, and late-night talk shows.212 Broadcasters dis-
tributed ffiers to family and religious groups defining each category
and urged newspapers to publish descriptions of each rating.213
The law did not specify its interplay with the current sixteen-hour
ban. Clearly, however, the two laws cannot co-exist because in order
for the V-Chip truly to serve its intended purpose of facilitating paren-
tal control, indecent material must be allowed over the airwaves; par-
ents who do not want their children to see this material must use the
V-Chip to avoid this speech.214 Further, once the V-Chip and ratings
scheme is in place, the sixteen-hour ban can no longer be upheld as
the least restrictive means to achieve any compelling interest.21 5 Fi-
nally, to allow the two to stand together would impermissibly impose
a "multi-layered" regulatory scheme.216 Professor J.M. Balkin's solu-
tion is to maintain the current scheme for a "sunset" period of seven
years to give the technology and the ratings time to take effect in the
market.217 Seven years might be too long a period of time, but Profes-
sor Balkin is generally correct. The sixteen-hour ban currently in
209 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 (1975) (holding that legislature
could not ban otherwise protected speech solely to protect children from ideas or images); ACT
II, 58 F.3d 654, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, CJ., dissenting) ("The Government does not
generally tell parents what speech their children should and should not hear .. "), cert denied,
116 S. Ct. 701 (1996); see supra section IV.A.1. But see Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consor-
tium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391 (1996) (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.) (affirming protection
interest as compelling); id. at 2416 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) (same).
210 Representative Markey rejected a suggestion that the V-Chip provision created a regime
in which a Big-Brother-type government is watching over children: "It's exactly the opposite.
It's more like Big Mother and Big Father. Parents take control." 141 CONG. REc. E1565, E1566
(daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey).
211 Lawrie Mifflin, TV Executives Introduce Rating System, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 20, 1996, at Al.
212 Id. News and sports will not be rated, although the definition of news was unclear. Id.
213 Id.
214 The two laws also cannot co-exist if the V-Chip law is truly to preserve the fundamental
First Amendment presumption of allowing willing viewers to see these programs. See supra note
19 and accompanying text.
215 Cf. Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2392 (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.) (noting that the V-Chip is
"significantly less restrictive" than provisions banning indecent speech).
216 Balkin, supra note 5, at 1155.
217 Id. at 1155-56. His suggestion that unrated programs be blocked also makes the current
time ban unnecessary. See id. at 1162-63; see also supra note 214.
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place must be eliminated as early as feasible and the V-Chip must
stand as the lone means of regulating broadcast content.
2. Constitutionality of the V-Chip.-The industry's development
of the ratings scheme means that the provision likely will not be chal-
lenged in court, barring some impasse. It is nonetheless worth consid-
ering whether the law could withstand constitutional challenge.218
The Supreme Court hinted at the result in Denver, noting that the V-
Chip provision was "significantly less restrictive" than any provisions
involving total bans on indecent speech.219
Any First Amendment challenge to the V-Chip would revolve
around the ratings requirement, which essentially forces broadcasters
to make some statement or judgment about a program's content by
rating it, for example, for sex, violence, or indecent language, even if
the broadcasters disagree with that judgment.2 0 The right of free
speech includes the right to refrain from speaking at all,22 1 and such
compelled speech is a content-based regulation that will be subject to
exacting First Amendment scrutiny.2 2 On the other hand, the V-Chip
scheme enhances the First Amendment rights of television viewers,
regarded as crucial in broadcasting,2 3 by eliminating the divergence
of First Amendment rights between those viewers who want to see
indecent material and those who do not, a divergence that exists
under the sixteen-hour ban. 22 4
The constitutional issue will turn on who establishes the rating
system and who determines the rating for a particular program.22 5
218 As a starting point, there is no constitutional problem with requiring the installation of the
V-Chip circuitry in television sets. The federal government in the past has directed industries to
make technological changes and innovations. See, eg., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 35 (1983) (reversing Department of Trans-
portation recision of regulations requiring airbags in new passenger automobiles).
219 Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2392. It clearly is less restrictive than the ban upheld in ACT II, 58
F.3d at 669-70, or the narrower ban Professor Baker proposes. Baker, supra note 24, at 57-58.
220 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1510.
221 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
222 Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) ("Mandating
speech that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech."
Therefore, the Court treated the Act in question as "a content-based regulation of speech."); id.
at 796-98 (striking down law requiring charitable organizations to release certain information);
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715-17 (requiring compelling interest to uphold law); Miami Herald Publ'g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974) (holding that law requiring newspaper to publish oppos-
ing views on some matters was subject to constitutional limitations).
223 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
224 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern for the rights of
the "many who think, act, and talk differently" from the majority of society). Under the new
law, willing viewers simply ignore the ratings, while unwilling viewers may heed the rating and
use the V-Chip to avert their eyes. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
225 See Minow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 110 ("[I]t clearly makes a difference who does the
rating, and it should not be the federal.., government."); Balkin, supra note 5, at 1174 (sug-
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Since the industry developed its own standards within the one year
allotted in the Act, the scheme should survive close scrutiny; the
Court likely would hold that the risk of censorship associated with a
private determination of program ratings is not the same as with a
governmental determination.2 6 If, on the other hand, the advisory
committee provided for in the law sets the ratings, the scheme would
face greater problems with the government declaring the message that
a speaker must present.2 7 Finally, the fact that lock-out technology
could work without ratings might enable a broadcaster to argue that
the ratings requirement is not the least restrictive means to serve the
facilitation interest.22 8
Another objection to a ratings requirement is the concern that
the rating would focus attention on one aspect of the program, thus
reshaping, biasing, and interfering with the way viewers experience
that program.229 However, the law does not require that the rating be
published or transmitted other than in the broadcast signal.230 Unlike
a rating or warning on a book or movie poster, no one must necessar-
gesting the possibility of numerous private ratings services to which a viewer could subscribe);
Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1515 (concluding that the best blocking scheme would have
the industry drive the standards).
226 See Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2385-87 (closely scrutinizing and upholding a law that allowed a
private person, rather than the government, to ban some indecent speech from cable); see also
Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1515 (arguing that merely imposing technological obliga-
tions "without a government thumb on the scales--cannot be seen to require, proscribe, burden,
or significantly affect speech.").
227 See Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1515 ("The regulation will raise problems only if
the government ordains the program characteristics upon which a lockout mechanism could op-
erate."). The original Senate version of the Act actually called for a government commission to
rate the programs. S. 652, 104th Cong. (1995).
Congress perhaps avoided this problem in the final law, however, because the advisory com-
mittee is empowered only to provide "guidelines and recommended procedures" for rating pro-
grams; the committee cannot determine the rating for a particular program.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. 140, (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)). The Conference Committee report emphasized this point: "[N]othing in
[this subsection] authorizes, and the conferees do not intend that, the Commission require the
adoption of the recommended rating system nor that any particular program be rated." S. Doe.
458, 104th Cong., at 195 (1996). But see Balkin, supra note 5, at 1159 (finding constitutional
troubles from even the threat of the advisory committee making judgments about program
content).
228 A lock-out scheme with no program ratings is far less intrusive on the rights of broadcast-
ers-no rating means no compelled speech, thus no First Amendment issue. Congress addressed
this possibility by providing for the elimination of ratings if a different, equally effective scheme
is developed. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
229 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1508. This concern for possible prejudice motivates
objections to labeling in other contexts. See, eg., OFFICE FOR INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AMERI-
CAN LIBRARY AssOcIATION, INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM MANUAL 111 (5th ed. 1996) (rejecting
labeling of books in libraries as "an attempt to prejudice attitudes" about speech).
230 Broadcasters agreed to flash a show's rating for fifteen seconds at the start of each pro-
gram. Mifflin, supra note 211. However, this was not mandated by the V-Chip law and is volun-
tary for First Amendment purposes. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1507 n.92 (arguing
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fly see a television program's rating; indeed, under this law many peo-
ple will only know a program had a particular rating if their V-Chip
blocks the show. This avoids the problem of the rating biasing the
perception of a program's message because viewers might not see or
know the rating.
Representative Edward Markey, sponsor of the law, along with
family and children's advocacy groups, wanted a ratings scheme that
would expressly identify the amount of sex, violence, and language in
each program. These groups opposed the age-appropriateness system
as ineffective because it did not provide parents with enough informa-
tion.231 However, rating for age appropriateness is less offensive to
the free speech rights of broadcasters, who are not required to focus
on and highlight one aspect of the program's content, but only to
make a general statement about that program's proper audience
based on a variety of factors. This is a more narrowly tailored require-
ment that still provides parents and the V-Chip technology with
enough information.
Professor Balkin focuses on a different issue, expressing his great-
est concern with the V-Chip's influence as an informational filter with
great power to shape culture.2 32 Since the technology permits parents
or viewers to control all the programs that reach their televisions, Pro-
fessor Balkin fears the creation of "an increasingly fractured commu-
nity of individuals fixated on their personal programming universe
.*... "23 While this is perhaps a valid concern, it is overstated. Indi-
viduals already maintain their own "personal programming uni-
verse[s]" by deciding what to watch, hear, or read; the additional filter
that the V-Chip provides will not fracture that culture any further.
Moreover, it is likely that the parents who will use the V-Chip are the
same parents who would not have watched, or allowed their children
to watch, programs containing indecent material; the minority of par-
ents who would want their children to see and hear ideas such as
George Carlin's monologue will simply ignore the filter3.2 4 Finally,
the V-Chip places the decision about how and when to use the filter in
the hands of individuals, where it belongs, rather than in the hands of
the government, where the sixteen-hour ban puts it.235
Other issues concerning the V-Chip involve what might be called
a chilling effect on speech. One concern is with self-censorship by
that advisory statements broadcast at the beginning of each program were voluntary and raised
no First Amendment problems).
231 Mifflin, supra note 211.
232 Balkin, supra note 5, at 1165.
233 Id. at 1174; see also HAuAAN, supra note 14, at 179 (arguing that children should be ex-
posed to the protected speech they will encounter in the world).
234 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235 See Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1564 (arguing that parents may adopt overbroad
restrictions on their children's speech, but government may not).
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producers to avoid bad ratings, a concern prevalent in the movie and
video industries.236 Another concern is broadcasters' fears of technol-
ogy that could eliminate an entire day's or week's programs at the
touch of a button.237 The key to this law, however, is that a parent or
unwilling viewer must program the V-Chip to block these programs.
The V-Chip thus supports the fundamental First Amendment pre-
sumption that speech should be readily available for willing viewers to
see and hear.238 So long as the button is controlled by parents or
viewers and not by the government, the First Amendment is protected
and advanced.239
There are also concerns from the other side. Some might worry
that this blocking scheme will be ineffective because some parents will
not take advantage of the new technology or the ratings.240 But it is
the right of parents to choose to set no rules for themselves or for
their children.241 The V-Chip, unlike the sixteen-hour ban upheld in
ACT III, leaves viewers and parents free to make that choice.
The V-Chip law to be implemented is the best hope for propo-
nents of regulating indecent speech,24 2 and thus is the second-best so-
lution. It allows protected speech to be broadcast, thus supporting the
constitutional rights of willing adult viewers, while at the same time
providing a real option to those who do not want themselves or their
children to see these programs. This law conforms to the presumption
236 See, eg., Richard P. Salgado, Regulating a Video Revolution, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y. REV.
516, 522-25 (1989) (discussing examples of self-censorship by movie producers to avoid 'X' rat-
ings); Balkin, supra note 5, at 1171 ("Any system of ratings will produce self-censorship .... ).
This concern actually arises in any compelled speech situation: the fear that the speaker will
avoid all speech to avoid having to make the counter-message. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974).
237 MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 25 (quoting Motion Picture Association of America
President Jack Valenti). The response of Minow and LaMay: "So long as a parent controls the
on-off switch, does it really matter where it is? If the V-Chip is unconstitutional, so is a remote-
control device-and so, too, are parents who control what their children watch." Id. at 25-26.
238 See supra notes 19 & 127 and accompanying text.
239 See MINow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 26 ("If we truly believe that... parents [do not]
have a duty or the right to intercede on their [children's] behalf, then we have converted the
First Amendment from a sword of freedom into a shackle of bondage."). The same is true for
unwilling listeners who want to avoid even brief exposure to indecent material.
240 MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 166.
241 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1564; Winer, supra note 12, at 522 ("Parental author-
ity, then, is the proper control over what children watch on television."). Supporters of the V-
Chip recognize, as the Pacifica Court did not, that "in our land of cultural pluralism, there are
many who think, act, and talk differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share
their fragile sensibilities." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also MiNow &
LAMAY, supra note 22, at 166 (arguing that "so long as Congress sees to it that [parents] have
every opportunity to block programs they do not want their children to see" the system is effec-
tive and constitutional).
242 Edwards & Berman, supra note 3, at 1566; see also Miow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at
164-66.
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of letting protected speech get over the airwaves, and it properly puts
the onus on the unwilling listeners to take affirmative steps to avoid
the speech.
Some might think it unwise to create a policy designed to screen
out part of the audience,243 or to create special rules governing pro-
tected speech.244 This Comment agrees that if free speech theory con-
trolled broadcasting, those criticisms would be valid and this law
unnecessary and possibly unconstitutional. 245 Unfortunately, theory
does not control.24 6 Thus, the V-Chip law, based on a compelling in-
terest in facilitating parental control over what their children see and
hear in the broadcast media, is the best course possible given the con-
flict between principles of free speech and the demand for Congress to
show that "something is being done."247 The key is that this law up-
holds the fundamental First Amendment presumption of allowing the
speech to get out over the airwaves.24 8
V. CONCLUSION
"We have, as a society, legitimate and contradictory goals in regu-
lating speech. The doctrines that move us toward one set of goals
move us away from the other. '249 Ultimately, "we can do no better
than a second-best solution." 250 The current sixteen-hour ban on in-
decent broadcasts, upheld in ACT II1, has subverted the free speech
rights of willing listeners and broadcasters to the "perceived needs of
governance"251-in this case, an independent interest in protecting
children from speech. As a matter of free speech philosophy, the best
solution is the rule that if the speech is protected, it cannot be regu-
lated.25 But given the desire for the government to show that "some-
243 See HAMiAN, supra note 14, at 178 (arguing against such a policy); MINow & LAMAY,
supra note 22, at 25 (discussing broadcasters who did not want people to have the power to
completely block-out some programming); Balkin, supra note 5, at 1165 (expressing concern
with creation of informational filters).
244 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting); SHMN, supra note 3, at 80-81;
Winer, supra note 12, at 525. But see MiNow & LAMAY, supra note 22, at 131 (discussing the
"child's First Amendment" and arguing that "considerations arise where children are involved
that do not arise with adults").
245 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
247 EMF-sON, supra note 17, at 502; see also Pown, supra note 4, at 187; Weinberg, supra note
9, at 1206.
248 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
249 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1206.
250 Id.
251 SHmRiN, supra note 3, at 5.
252 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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thing is being done"25 3 it is politically impossible "to conform our law
to ordinary free-speech philosophy" entirely.25 4
This Comment sought and outlined the second-best solution, one
with more respect for First Amendment theory and doctrine than the
current system.25 5 First, this Comment showed the stark and gratui-
tous conflict between the current system of regulation and the First
Amendment: the lesser protection afforded broadcasting despite the
lack of justification and the subversion of the constitutional rights of
all adults, and parents in particular, as the government makes parental
decisions and cuts off protected speech at the source.256
Second, this Comment outlined the key elements of a regulatory
scheme more in touch with the First Amendment while providing un-
willing listeners with realistic options. The most important of these is
adherence to the fundamental First Amendment presumption that
protected speech must be allowed out over the airwaves to be seen by
willing viewers; the government cannot stop this speech at the
source.257 Other elements discussed included granting broadcasting
full First Amendment protection; recognizing that Congress's sole in-
terest was in facilitating parental control over their children's televi-
sion viewing;25 8 and employing institutional safeguards to enable
parents to regulate what their children see and hear.259 Finally, this
Comment concluded that Congress had created the second-best solu-
tion with the V-Chip provision of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
This is not simply conforming regulation to speech law, as Profes-
sor Weinberg feared.260 Rather, the V-Chip law supports the funda-
mental First Amendment presumption by permitting protected speech
to reach the willing viewer, and by placing a real choice in the hands
of the individual or parent. This is the second-best regulatory scheme:
the only workable way to reconcile two worldviews that are not easily
reconcilable, 261 while respecting some of the underlying ideals of both.
253 EMERSON, supra note 17, at 502.
254 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1206.
255 Telecomm. Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139-40 (1996) (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)).
256 See supra Part III.
257 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
258 See supra section IV.A.1.
259 See supra section IV.A.2.
260 Weinberg, supra note 9, at 1206.
261 Id.; see supra subpart IV.B.
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